Fear and market failure: global imbalences and "self-insurance" by Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei
 1 
FEAR AND MARKET FAILURE: 
GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND “SELF- INSURANCE” 
 
Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang 
 
CSGR Working Paper No. 216/07 
 
December 2006
 2
Fear and Market Failure: Global Imbalances and “Self-insurance” 
Marcus Miller1 and Lei Zhang2 
CSGR Working Paper 216/07 
December 2006 
 
Abstract: 
 
Two key issues are examined in an integrated framework: the emergence of global 
imbalances and the precautionary motive for accumulating reserves. Standard models of 
general equilibrium would predict modest current account surpluses in the emerging markets 
if they face higher risk than the US itself. But, with pronounced Loss Aversion in emerging 
markets, their precautionary savings can generate substantial ‘global imbalances’, especially 
if there is an inefficient supply of global ‘insurance’. A combination of fear and market 
failure generates imbalances as a general equilibrium outcome. In principle, lower real 
interest rates will ensure aggregate demand equals supply at a global level: but disequilibrium 
may result if the required real interest rate is negative. 
 
A precautionary savings glut appears to us to be a temporary phenomenon, however, destined 
for correction as and when adequate reserve levels are achieved. If the process of correction is 
triggered by ‘Sudden Stop’ on capital flows to the US, might this not lead to “hard landing” 
that is forecast by several leading macroeconomists? When precautionary saving is combined 
with financial panic, history offers no guarantee of full employment. 
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FEAR AND MARKET FAILURE: GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND “SELF-
INSURANCE” 
 
 
Non Technical Summary 
 
Are the present current account imbalances – including notably a US external deficit 
now running at 7% of its national output – part of the normal ebb and flow of trade 
and finance; or are there special factors at work? Is laissez faire the appropriate 
policy or is there a case for policy coordination? It depends who you ask. 
 
According to Nouriel Roubini, looking for factors to account for current global 
imbalances is rather like solving a ‘whodunnit’: and the two most plausible culprits 
turn out to be the US and Asia. He notes, for example, that from 2000 to 2004 US 
fiscal policy showed a large swing into deficit of almost 6% of GDP. But matters 
have, he argues, changed since 2005: the US fiscal deficit has shrunk somewhat but 
the external deficit continues to widen. The ‘global savings glut’ identified by Mr 
Bernanke, allied with weak investment in East Asia following the crisis experience of 
1997/8 are named as key factors. 
 
A very different perspective is offered by David Backus and co-authors, however. 
They bridle at the use of the term global imbalances; and by the same token they 
reject the idea of looking for special factors or ‘culprits’ associated with them. What 
we observe, they suggest, is business-as-usual: for this no special explanation (nor 
any policy initiatives) are required. 
 
To investigate how plausible it is that standard optimising behaviour explains what 
we observe – and, if not, what special factors need to be introduced - we employ a 
simple global model of trade and finance which incorporates elements of higher risk 
faced in emerging markets. 
 
What we find is that an orthodox general equilibrium approach fails to produce 
significant imbalances, in part because of assuming that efficient competitive asset 
markets spread risk globally. To this extent, we must part company from Backus and 
co-authors. But things change when we go further to introduce unorthodox features 
into the model: then, the general equilibrium approach does produce imbalances. 
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What are these factors? We refer to them in summary fashion as fear and market 
failure. The former refers to the scarring effects that the East Asia crisis has had on 
countries in the region; for which the concept of Loss Aversion is introduced in 
modelling aggregate demand by emerging markets. The latter refers to the absence 
of efficient means to spread the risk.  
 
Even when countries are profoundly loss averse - determined to avoid the downside 
consumption shocks of the recent past – we find that efficient asset markets can, in 
principle, provide the necessary assurance without a savings glut.  It is when 
appropriate insurance is not available that fearful consumers self-insure through 
saving, and global imbalances begin to emerge. Our approach is one in which we 
integrate the precautionary motive for accumulating reserves into a model of global 
imbalances.  
 
Joseph Stiglitz remarks that  “The East Asian countries that constitute the class of ’97 
– the countries that learned the lessons of instability the hard way in the crises that 
began in that year – have boosted their reserves in part because they wanted to 
make sure that they won’t need to borrow from the IMF again. Others, who saw their 
neighbours suffer, came to the same conclusion – it is imperative to have enough 
reserves to withstand the worst of the world’s economic vicissitudes.” A combination 
of fear and market failure generates this scenario as a general equilibrium outcome.  
 
The effect of precautionary behaviour in depressing real interest rates (and possibly 
employment) is, however, checked by the US acting as ‘consumer-of-last-resort’. But 
there are risks for the global economy. In the immediate short run, interest rates 
might hit a floor – the so-called Liquidity Trap – where the consumer of last resort 
fails to match precautionary savings, and global demand falls below supply. This is 
especially true if those outside the US are no longer willing to accumulate US debt 
and the US is faced with a ‘Sudden Stop’ in its deficit financing  
 
Over the longer run, we have effectively assumed that demand in Emerging Markets 
will rise strongly when adequate reserve levels have been achieved. But this may 
well be excessively optimistic – posing similar issues of adjusting demand in the 
longer term. The simplifying assumption of only one good conceals the need for 
exchange rate changes to accompany this adjustment – as described by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff – and the need to avoid exchange rate “overshooting” along the way. 
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Roubini sees an important role for the IMF in this process of adjustment. This may 
well prove to be true. But it will surely involve a substantial change from the current 
situation, where the behaviour of emerging markets reflects considerable fear and 
mistrust of global financial markets – and a loss of confidence in the IMF. As Martin 
Wolf has observed: “the failure to create stable net flows of capital from the rich world 
to the poor one is arguably the greatest failure of the second age of globalisation”.  
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Introduction 
 
Current forecasts of global growth may be benign, but they pose interesting puzzles. 
If growth is expected to proceed at a healthy rate, why are real interest rates so low 
(Greenspan’s conundrum)? If the current account US deficit proves unsustainable, 
how is it to adjust? Will this be assisted by policy coordination3, as for the dollar in the 
1980s: or can it be left to market forces? Before developing a simple global model to 
show how low real interest rates around the world and high savings outside the USA 
may be explained by attitudes towards risk, we briefly outline some influential but 
contrasting views currently in circulation4. 
 
Bretton Woods 2; ‘Charles River’ reactions; and ‘Dark matter’ 
 
To understand current events some argue that one needs to look back fifty years to 
the creation of the Bretton Woods system of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates. 
Then, after WW II was over, the major economies of Europe pegged against the US 
dollar at exchange rates low enough to permit export-led recovery and a 
reconstitution of reserves. Now, in the 21st century, it is not recovery from war but 
emergence from relative poverty that dictates the choice of regime; and the currency 
that is effectively pegged against the dollar is the Chinese remnimbi in what  Dooley 
et al. (2004) call a revived Bretton Woods (hereafter BW2). 
 
In their eyes, a policy of export-led growth, giving jobs to the millions who are leaving 
the land to seek jobs in manufacturing, makes good sense for China, now and for 
some time to come. And China is willing to hold the US securities that are financing 
the counterpart US deficits, a ready store of liquidity available to head off virulent 
financial panic of the type that swept East Asia in 1997/8. (If that was like bank run, 
as Jeffrey Sachs suggested at the time, China is now enabled to act as a regional 
lender-of-last-resort, and it is in fact party to regional swap arrangements to boost 
confidence, Kohlscheen and Taylor, 2006). 
 
Support for the viability of BW2 has been provided by Richard Cooper of Harvard 
University, a close observer of the Chinese scene, who argues that the investing 
domestic savings in dollars makes good sense for a country plagued with insecurity 
                                                 
3 As argued recently by the Governor of the Bank of England (King, 2006). 
4 A more comprehensive list is to be found in Roubini (2006). 
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of property rights. This view effectively attributes to the US an ‘exorbitant privilege’ 
akin to monopoly in the issue of money as a liquid store of value: so the US is 
exporting security of ownership in exchange for cheap manufactures of goods. 
 
Cooper’s view has been provided with intriguing theoretical underpinning in a recent 
paper whose first author is at nearby MIT. Caballero et al. (2006) specify an infinite 
horizon OLG model of global demand and supply, where one group of countries is 
restricted in its ability to capitalise on future earnings. They show how this reduces 
the group’s effective wealth in global capital markets, lowering world interest rates 
and redistributing consumption towards countries that are not so restricted. 
Conditional on the existence of such capital market constraints, the constellation of 
low real rates and ‘global imbalances’ is an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea that 
agents whose budget constraints reflect current income rather than expected future 
flows will restrict their consumption accordingly may sound rather Keynesian; but, on 
their analysis, the restriction leads to lower interest rates not unemployment. 
 
Rather than shackles that may hobble Asian economies, Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger (2005) appeal to the quasi-monopoly power of the US to explain the 
viability of the current regime5. The country may be running deficits as conventionally 
measured, but this is offset, they argue, by the acquisition of assets that are 
improperly accounted for. The missing elements, so-called dark matter, reflect quasi–
rents in three areas: in the issuance of money in the form of dollar bills (seigniorage); 
in the provision of secure assets for a risky world; and in the supply of 
entrepreneurial know-how (adding ‘goodwill’ to US FDI).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 An analysis that may find support in Meissner and Taylor (2006). 
 8
The Transfer Problem; the Peso Problem; and the Risk of Recession 
 
The sanguine view of a revived and relatively durable BW2 has been subjected to 
persistent and detailed criticism from academics, market watchers and think tanks, 
many located in the US itself. What then of those who see cracks in the edifice, signs 
of the demise of a regime created by peradventure and sustained by US deficits 
which would merit severe downgrades for any other sovereign borrower? 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), for example, judge the pattern of global imbalances to 
be unsustainable. To calibrate the adjustments needed to correct for this they appeal 
to an earlier historical episode – the transfer of resources from Germany to the Allies 
after WWI. Since the US is absorbing more than it produces (pace Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger), this will have shifted the real exchange rate, with the terms of trade 
moving in favour of US exports and the price of non-traded goods in the US rising 
relative to foreign counterparts. As and when the US curbs its absorption, the real 
exchange rate must adjust to reflect the shift of global demand. This may require a 
thirty percent devaluation of the dollar (a weighted average of a 10% shift in the 
terms of trade and 40% shift in the relative price of non-traded goods, very  
approximately).  
 
Their timely treatment is, however, subject to two criticisms. First, the model is static 
so it has little to say about the global interest rates. It is an account of general 
equilibrium in a global endowment economy, with inter-temporal issues left to one 
side: the US deficit continues until, at some unspecified date, capital markets cry halt 
and the dollar falls to secure the appropriate reallocation of consumption. Second, in 
the process of adjustment it is assumed that national income constraints mimic those 
of a “transfer” problem; but it is far from clear why unilateral action by the US to 
reduce absorption will lead to expanded absorption elsewhere, especially if the 
trigger for the US adjustment is a Sudden Stop in capital flows to the world’s largest 
economy. 
 
Assuming that the end of BW2 will involve a significant dollar devaluation, this should 
surely have implications for the global pattern of interest rates. Indeed, as Jim 
Hanson has pointed out6, it implies existence of a ‘peso problem’. If people expect a 
30% dollar devaluation at some random time, then US assets should offer a 
                                                 
6 In his contribution to  the conference on “Global Imbalances and Risk Management Has the center 
become the periphery?”, Madrid May 2006. 
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devaluation premium. A peso problem in emerging market economies pushes their 
interest rates above the US rate: in this case, however, it is the rest of the world that 
adjusts. Given that the US sets rates, other countries have to pump in liquidity to 
lower theirs. This offers an alternative explanation for low rates to the capital 
constrained view of Caballero et al. (2006); and a prediction for US/ non-US 
differentials that does not exist in their model.  
 
Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser have expressed persistent doubts as to how long 
current imbalances can be sustained, Roubini(2006), Setser (2006). Their scepticism 
is shared by Fred Bergsten and his colleagues at the IIE who have been calling for a 
dollar devaluation for some time, Bergsten and Williamson (2004). Their calculation 
of a multilateral adjustment of exchange rates implicitly rejects the view taken in 
some quarters that ‘the Euro is no part of the problem, so it is no part of the solution’. 
Insofar as these calculations assume no collapse of global demand they may like 
Obstfeld and Rogoff be assuming effective ‘transfers’ (or they may be assuming 
successful monetary stabilisation of world demand). Martin Wolf is perhaps the most 
widely-read proponent of the view that substantial rebalancing of global demand and 
adjustment of exchange rates is necessary for sustainability. 
 
It is a matter of history that the transfers mandated by the victorious allies after WWI 
were followed not by smooth economic adjustment but by falling demand and, 
ultimately, by the Great Depression. This may well be the historical precedent that 
prompts the warnings of possible disaster made by Barry Eichengreen, an expert on 
the Gold Standard and its collapse. He and Yung Park of Seoul University outline a 
scenario where a Sudden Stop in the lending to the US leads to a collapse in the 
dollar with rising interest rates to prevent overshooting (and an accompanying 
collapse of asset prices, especially housing): and the combination of rising rates and 
falling demand in the US  leads to deficient demand at a global level (Eichengreen 
and Park, 2006). 
 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of these views, classified by whether the need to 
adjust the pattern of global demand and/ or the need to adjust the dollar exchange 
rate is seen as a major problem. 7  Outright optimism, which sees neither as a 
problem, appears in the upper left right corner, represented by Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger - for whom Dark Matter dispels all doubts – and by Backus et al. 
                                                 
7 For an alternative summary, listing ten causes of current imbalances, see Roubini (2006). 
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(2006). Pessimists, who see both issues as needing adjustment appear in the bottom 
right, including Setser (2006), Eichengreen and Park and Martin Wolf. 
 No exchange rate 
problem 
Some dollar 
overvaluation 
Unsustainable 
overvaluation 
No imbalance 
of demand  
H and S: “Dark 
Matter” 
Backus et al.  
  
Some 
demand 
imbalance 
Cooper 
Caballero et al: 
“Constrained 
Equilibrium” 
 
Dooley and Garber: 
“BW2” Obstfeld and 
Rogoff: “The Transfer 
Problem” 
Unsustainable 
demand  
imbalance 
Our view  
Roubini and Setser 
Bergsten and 
Williamson 
Eichengreen and Par 
Martin Wolf 
Table 1. Global imbalances and the dollar: differing assessments 
 
Between these poles are two other groups. First, Dooley and Garber with their BW2 
perspective, where benign US deficits are sustainable for some time to come. 8 
Second, those who see the savings glut as sustainable long-term for institutional 
reasons: this ‘Charles River School’ includes both Cooper and Caballero et al.  
 
The integrated approach proposed in this paper differs from all the above9: it explains 
the emergence of the global imbalances as a result of precautionary behaviour by 
emerging markets exacerbated by incomplete markets for insurance. Empirical 
evidence of precautionary behaviour on the part of emerging markets is documented 
in Aizenman and Lee (2005, p8) who find that “In terms of horse race between the 
mercantilist and precautionary views of international reserves, our results suggest 
that the precautionary motive played a more visible role … than the mercantilist 
motive.”  
 
                                                 
8 This perspective, where international reserve accumulation is triggered by concern about export 
competitiveness, is referred to as Mercantilist view in Aizenman and Lee (2005). 
9 Because we use a one-good model it belongs at the foot of the first column of the Table: but an 
extension with more goods would appear in bottom right.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Using the Fisherian inter-temporal approach, 
Section 2 briefly looks at the savings when there is no uncertainty. Section 3 
develops the benchmark model of general equilibrium with uncertainty where risk in 
the emerging markets (henceforth referred to as ‘EM’) is shared with the US without 
substantial surpluses or deficits. Section 4 introduces loss aversion and 
precautionary saving. In the absence of complete markets, substantial risk can lead 
to substantial imbalances and negative real interest rates. Interestingly, the absence 
of insurance allows us to use Fisher’s approach to characterise a global equilibrium 
of fear and market failure. Section 5 discusses whether strategic factors may account 
for the limitation of insurance markets. Section 6 discusses sustainability and the 
temporary nature of the precautionary savings. Section 7 considers the possible 
emergence of Keynesian equilibrium due to a Liquidity Trap and/ or a ‘Sudden Stop’ 
in capital flows. Section 8 concludes that a savings glut could lead to deficient world 
demand if it is combined with financial panic that prevents the US from acting as 
“consumer of last resort”. 
 
 
2. External Imbalances and Irving Fisher  
 
Irving Fisher viewed savings and investment decisions from the perspective of 
optimising consumption over time 10 : and applying this perspective to countries 
involved in international trade has led to the now-popular inter-temporal approach to 
the balance of payments. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 1) express it, 
“Much of the macroeconomic action in an open economy is connected with its inter-
temporal trade, which is measured by the current account of the balance of 
payments”. 
 
Before introducing our general equilibrium approach, which includes risk as well, we 
sketch three variants of the neo-Fisherian perspective that bear on the current 
debate. First that current account imbalances may reflect international differences in 
growth rates, as suggested by Backus et al. (2006); second that, with no growth 
differentials, imbalances may reflect capital market constraints, as in Caballero et al. 
(2005); a third, closely-related possibility is that behaviour may be reflecting insecure 
                                                 
10 As, in a full employment context, did Keynes and Ramsey (1928).   
 12
property rights in the EM, the Cooper hypothesis. These can be illustrated simply as 
in Figure 1. 
 
   
Figure 1. Fisher diagram: differentials in growth, wealth constraint and pessimism 
 
First let the endowment of the US be at point A and that of EM at A’, the former 
exhibiting high growth and the latter no growth. Given identical tastes, these growth 
differentials provide incentives for inter-temporal trade. The US can smooth 
consumption by consuming EM saving at interest rates lying between the pure rate of 
time-preference shown at A’ and the much high rate of inter-temporal substitution at 
point A (where the slope of the indifference curve also reflects the high growth rate).  
The equilibrium trade vectors are shown by A’B and AC and both countries end up 
consuming on the same ray from the origin. We believe this captures the spirit of the 
“business-as-usual” global equilibrium perspective of Backus et al. (though it is 
admittedly something of a caricature as growth differentials are taken as exogenous). 
 
Next assume by contrast that both countries have identical endowments at point A.  
While the US consumes with the appropriate inter-temporal budget constraint, let the 
EM be constrained to lower budget line passing through A’ as might be the case if 
capital markets fail to take due account of future endowments. The consumption and 
savings in period 1 will be precisely the same as for the case of growth differentials.  
Could this represent the capital-constrained perspective of Caballero et al? (Probably 
not, because it would not be sensible for the EM to save knowing that it is about to 
receive the same endowment as the US!) 
A
A’ 
B 
C 
C1, Y1 
C2, Y2 
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But what if consumers in the EM are not sure that they will secure the extra output- 
because of ill-defined property rights, as Cooper says is true in China? Then they 
might act ‘as if’ their expectations of the growth in the EM were unduly pessimistic – 
as if they expected output in EM to be stationary, for example. In which case, despite 
the fact that both countries have identical endowments at point A, insecure 
ownership might lead to the same high savings in EM and low global interest rates as 
predicted Backus et al.  
 
These inter-temporal accounts are essentially deterministic: would a stochastic 
specification have something more to offer? This is what we explore next, first with 
standard (logarithmic) preferences and then with the introduction of loss aversion. 
With the addition of market failure, we find that loss aversion generates a constrained 
equilibrium rather similar to that of Cabbellero et al. and Cooper.  
 
3. General Equilibrium with Complete Markets 
 
To incorporate risk, we use a simplified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model in the tradition of Mas-Colell et al (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996). This stylised one good model has two time periods, two states of nature and 
two countries – the US and EM; and we use the asterisk suffix ‘*’ to denote EM.  The 
framework is similar to that used earlier to study global finance and the US New 
Economy in Miller et al (2005, 2006), though the endowment pattern reflects the 
traditional situation where the US invests in risky assets and supplies safety and 
security in exchange (Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005).  
 
Rather than postulating growth differentials, with low growth for the EM accounting 
for low world real interest rates and large US deficits, we assume identical expected 
growth but differential risk. Specifically growth prospects in EM have greater volatility 
than for the US, modelled by adding a mean-preserving spread. Though this does 
not have a great impact in a standard general equilibrium framework, results change 
when downside risk is aggravated by a form of Loss Aversion. (The utility of 
consumption in period 2 which lies below that reached in the previous period is 
sharply discounted.) In a stochastic environment, the resulting risk sensitivity can 
lead the EM to acquire substantial insurance; and to act ‘as if’ it underestimates the 
mathematical expectation of growth. 
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When the relevant insurance is not available (or the provision is not credible), the EM 
can always ‘self-insure’ – saving instead of swapping financial promises. So the 
desire to limit downside risk can make the EM act ‘as if’ it has very low time 
preference as we show in numerical outcomes below. Combining inadequate 
insurance with Loss Aversion provides a ready explanation for low interest rates, the 
US deficit and high EM savings.  
 
To put this in context, consider the case of China. After what happened to many East 
Asian countries in 1997/811, it is clear that interruptions to trend growth are perfectly 
possible: and the rampant Chinese Dragon may be no more immune to shocks than 
were the Asian Tigers. In the words of Peter Nolan (2004, pp48-49): 
 
Today, the Chinese economy is growing fast, but the lesson from 
the past, especially the Asian Financial Crisis, is that perceptions 
can change overnight. China is today the last remaining large 
‘Growth story’ in the world; it already has a huge ‘bubble’ of FDI, 
with the largest FDI inflows of any economy in the world… It is easy 
to imagine how the bubble might burst, and the flow of capital be 
reversed, with huge potential de-stabilizing consequences for the 
economy and society. There would then be a full-blown ‘Chinese 
Financial Crisis’. A central goal of policy must be to avoid such an 
outcome. [Italics added] 
 
If there is concern that consumption on the downside should not fall relative to past 
levels, China can of course seek insurance by selling FDI and buying US government 
bonds: and it can also seek to self-insure by acquiring US bonds via the current 
account. If, for any reason, the first option is limited, then self-insurance will be seen 
as the only way to avoid an unappealing prospect – the prospect, perhaps, of 
humiliation like that suffered by its near neighbour South Korea in 1997/1998 when it 
had to go cap in hand to the IMF and G7 and sacrifice sovereignty to get the financial 
support it needed in the crisis.12 
                                                 
11 when, in the crisis, trend growth rates effectively  changed sign. 
12 Stiglitz (2006, p248) comments “The East Asian countries that constitute the class of ’97 – the 
countries that learned the lessons of instability the hard way in the crises that began in that year – have 
boosted their reserves in part because they wanted to make sure that they won’t need to borrow from 
the IMF again. Others, who saw their neighbours suffer, came to the same conclusion – it is imperative 
to have enough reserves to withstand the worst of the world’s economic vicissitudes.” 
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These considerations may suggest that strategic factors play a role that is not 
captured in the competitive framework we use here13– that some sort of insurance 
market game may be in process. This is discussed briefly in section 4 below. 
3.1 The Benchmark Case 
 
The pattern of endowments assumed is indicated in Table 2. Both blocs are endowed 
with one unit at time one. In expected terms each bloc grows at the rate g , say three 
percent. In the absence of uncertainty each bloc would consume its endowment and, 
with log utility, real interest rates would equal growth rate plus the pure rate of time 
preference. If the latter were, say, 1.5 percent, this would imply the global real 
interest rates of 4.5%.  
 
With uncertainty, consider the case where future endowments for EM can take one of 
two values: high and low, with a standard deviation of σ  around the mean rate of 
growth. (For convenience, each of the two outcomes is treated equi-probable; and in 
simulationsσ  varies between 3 to 12 %. But the assumption of symmetry for the 
shocks to EM growth is made for expositional convenience. The main results are 
independent of the shape of the probability distribution, as is noted below.) 
 USA EM 
  High (with 
probability π ) 
Low (with 
probability π−1 ) 
Period 1 11 =Y  1*1 =Y  1*1 =Y  
Period 2 gYY +== 1)2()1( 22 σ++= gY 1)1(*2 σ−+= gY 1)2(*2  
Table 2. The pattern of endowments 
To study the pattern of savings and world real interest rates, we first present 
benchmark results where the complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities can be traded. 
Later we look at how these results may change if the set of securities is restricted or 
preferences modified. To simplify the exposition of the benchmark results, we 
assume representative consumers in both countries share identical preferences. 
Home country’s lifetime utility is given by 
 
                                                 
13 We are grateful to Sayantan Ghosal for this observation. It carries the implication that the model of 
‘unrelentingly competitive’ Incomplete General Equilibrium with default studied by Dubey et al (2005) 
is not really appropriate here. 
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))]2(ln()1())1(ln([)ln())(,( 22121 CCCCCU ππβ −++=⋅    (1) 
 
where β  is time preference, 1C  and )(2 ⋅C  are period 1 and period 2 consumption 
respectively. The budget constraint of US is given by 
 
WYqYqYCqCqC ≡++=++ )2()2()1()1()2()2()1()1( 221221    (2) 
 
where 0)( >sq  ( 2,1=s ) are Arrow prices measured in period 1 sure consumption, 
and W  is the present value of US’s total wealth.  
 
Given Arrow prices, US’s optimal consumption implied by its first order conditions are 
simply 
β+= 11
WC .        (3) 
12 )1(
)1( C
q
C βπ=        (4) 
12 )2(
)1()2( C
q
C πβ −=        (5) 
 
Those for EM follow the same forms. 
 
Applying equilibrium conditions, that total consumption in each period and state 
equals the corresponding total endowment, determines the equilibrium Arrow prices 
and real interest rates as follows: 
 
)1(/)1( 21
WW YYq πβ=       (6) 
)2(/)1()2( 21
WW YYq βπ−=      (7) 
 )1/(1)( rsq
s
+=∑       (8) 
 
where superscript W indicates world endowment. The pattern of consumption is 
obtained by substituting (6) and (7) into (3), (4) and (5). 
 
With the endowments specified in Table 2, EM has an incentive to save in period 1. 
This is evident from a comparison of EM wealth relative to US wealth. Note that 
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WqqWW <−−= )))1()2(((* σ  
where σ is the standard deviation of the EM endowment and )1()2( qq > . 
 
Because EM wealth is relatively lower, so is consumption, i.e. 
1
**
1 )1/()1/( CWWC =+<+= ββ . So EM saves, matched by a US current account 
deficit. Clearly the more volatile is EM’s endowment is in period 2 (i.e. the greater is 
σ ), the higher will be its period 1 savings. But with log utility and efficient provision of 
‘insurance’, the savings effects are distinctly modest, as will be seen in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
High state EM 
US 
Contract 
Curve 
Endowment Point 
A 
Low 
state 
-σ
g
Mean income for EM
Y*1
E B
Insurance
Saving
+σ
 
Figure 2. Endowments and trading opportunities in Period 2 – the Edgeworth Box 
 
How securities markets provide this insurance is indicated graphically in Figure 2, an 
Edgeworth box diagram as in Mas-Colell et al (p.593, 1995) describing allocations in 
period 2. Outcomes for the high payoff state are on the horizontal and for the low 
payoff state on the vertical, and utility for the EM is measured from the lower left 
corner and that for US from the upper right. Identical probability assessments and 
utility functions imply that the contract curve is the diagonal in the figure.14 The 
autarky endowment point is at A, where for the US – identical endowments in both 
states – this lies on the 45-degree line measured from the upper right corner. For the 
EM, however, disparity in the endowment between the two states means that it lies to 
                                                 
14 The assumption of identical utility is more restrictive than Mas-Colell et al (p.693, 1995) where the 
contract curve is non-linear. 
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the right of the 45-degree line drawn from the bottom left corner. Ignoring the effect of 
the first period savings on reallocating entitlements (as they are so small, see Table 
3), general equilibrium consumption is shown at point E (on the contract curve).  
 
How much does aggregate risk affect global interest rates and current account 
imbalances? Not very much, if we use parameter values of 985.0=β , 2/1=π , and 
endowments from Table 2, where average growth is 3% in both blocs. 
 
  3σ =  12σ =  
US deficit 0.01  0.2  Benchmark 
Real interest rate  4.5%  4.2% 
US deficit 0.02  0.34  Bonds-only 
Real interest rate  4.5%  3.9% 
US deficit 0.01  1.2  LA with 
complete 
markets 
Real interest rate  4.5%  3.5% 
US deficit 0.02  4.6  LA with 
bonds-only Real interest rate  4.5%  -4.3% 
Table 3. US deficits and the world real interest rates: 4 cases. 
Note: LA refers to Loss Aversion. US deficits are measured as percentage of period 
1 GDP. All simulations assume equi-probable states; but, for the case of LA and 
bonds only, the results are in fact independent of state probabilities. 
 
From lines 2 and 3 for the Benchmark case in Table 3, it is evident that stochastic 
endowments for the EM do lead to some lowering of world interest rates and some 
increase in the US deficit as the theory predicts: but with log preferences the 
quantitative effects are very small. Increasing the standard deviation from 3% to 
12%, for example, only increases the US deficit by one fifth of a percentage point of 
GDP; and it shaves a mere 30 basis points off the world interest rate.  
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Figure 3: Buying insurance: a swap of GDP-Bonds. 
 
 
Given the asymmetry of global endowments, consumption risk in the EM is not 
diversified away: but it is shared as shown in Figure 3. This involves the EM 
exchanging claims on output in state 1 for claims in state 2 at the relative price 
indicated by the slope of AE. The slope of this vector in absolute terms 
is (1) / (2) 1q q < , reflecting of the relative abundance of goods in high state.] 
 In the absence of Arrow securities, what assets might sustain this equilibrium? 
Consumption at E may be achieved by the sale of GDP-bonds from the US (vector 
AB) in exchange for GDP-bonds of the EM (labelled FDI in the Figure, see vector 
BE). Consider sales of US government securities in exchange for FDI in China, for 
example. For further discussion of GDP bonds, see Griffith-Jones and Sharma 
(2006), Griffith-Jones and Shiller (2006). 
 
 
3.2. Equilibrium with no “insurance” 
 
What if the only asset traded between the two countries is a bond which has the 
same payoff in both states in period 2? In the absence of insurance possibilities, the 
EM will save more in period 1 to avoid potential utility losses were it to consume its 
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unequal endowments in period 2, and the extra savings will bring down the global 
rate of interest. This can be shown as follows. 
 
Denote S  the first period saving by US (the amount of bonds purchased), its optimal 
level is determined by the solution to the following problem: 
))]}2(ln()1())1(ln([){ln( 221 CCCMaxS ππβ −++    (8a) 
subject to 
SYC −= 11         (8b) 
SrYC )1()1()1( 22 ++=       (8c) 
SrYC )1()2()2( 22 ++=       (8d) 
where )1( r+  is the gross real interest rates. 
 
As 222 )2()1( YYY == , the optimal saving implies the period 1 consumption 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+++= r
YYC
11
1 2
11 β       (8e) 
 
One can solve for a similar problem for EM to yield its period 1 consumption 
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Imposing equilibrium condition 
1
*
11 2YCC =+  
yields the following fixed point condition for real interest rates 
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2
2
1
2 =++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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⎛ −+ ςββξβ Yr
YY
r
Y
   (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) are used to generate numerical results in lines 4 and 5 for the 
Bonds-only case in Table 3. 
 
EM saving as percentage of GDP (and the US deficit) is twice as large as in the 
Benchmark case, but it still remains very small even when standard deviation of the 
 21
shock to its endowment rises to 12%.  With log utility, therefore, eliminating insurance 
does not predict a savings glut in the EM. (The effect of increasing risk on the world 
interest rate is more pronounced: it falls by 60 basis points, to less than 4%, when 
the standard deviation increases from 3 to 12%.)  
 
4. Global Equilibrium with Loss Aversion 
 
4.1. Loss aversion with a complete set of Arrow securities 
 
In this section, we modify the preferences of the EM by incorporating two elements 
from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): namely, reference 
dependence and loss aversion. We assume that consumption achieved in the 
previous period acts as a reference in the current period, so the measurement of 
utility depends on whether there is a “loss” or a “gain” in current consumption relative 
to this reference. To capture loss aversion, we assume that, close to the reference 
point, the increase in utility of a unit “gain” in current consumption (relative to the 
reference) is much smaller than the decrease in utility of a unit “loss” in current 
consumption.  
 
Specifically, let the utility of state i consumption be defined as 
⎩⎨
⎧
<
≥= *
1
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2*
2 )()/)(ln(
)()/)(ln(
))((
CiCifCiC
CiCifCiC
iCu λ     (11) 
where 1>λ  indicates the degree of loss aversion. (Note that the utility measure 
becomes negative for consumption below reference level.) 
 
To make the following treatment tractable, we consider a limiting case of loss 
aversion, namely, +∞→λ . Under this simplification which implies extreme disutility 
of any contraction of consumption, (11) is equivalent to imposing the constraint that 
*
1
*
2 )( CiC ≥          (12) 
 
The procedure used here, of imposing the constraint that next period’s consumption 
in any state of the world should not fall below consumption in the current period, 
could also be viewed as an extreme form of habit formation as widely used in 
macroeconomic models. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), in their attempts to 
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determine whether sticky prices can lead to volatile and persistent real exchange rate 
movements, for example, assume in one experiment that the utility from consumption 
depends not on current consumption but its level relative to a fraction of last period’s 
aggregate consumption. A similar formulation has also been used by Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and 
Uribe (2004). As Carroll et al show, with this form of habit-persistence in 
consumption, higher growth may lead to higher saving.  
 
In what follows, we show that loss aversion can also increase savings, but only if 
consumption would otherwise have fallen below the reference trigger. With complete 
contingent securities, US optimal consumption is derived in the same way as in 
Section 2.1. But EM’s optimal consumptions are solutions to the following problem: 
))]}2(ln()1())1(ln([){ln( *2
*
2
*
1)(, *2
*
1
CCCMax iCC ππβ −++    (13) 
subject to the budget constraint 
**
2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
2
*
1 )2()2()1()1()2()2()1()1( WYqYqYCqCqC
LALALALA ≡++=++  (14) 
and (12). 
 
How does loss aversion in EM change the equilibrium prices and allocation? We 
summarise these results in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. If 2gσ ≤ , equilibrium prices and allocation are the same as those in 
Section 2.1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Note that with complete Arrow securities, both countries can share risks. This risk-
sharing means that both countries consume more or less equal proportions of the 
aggregate state endowment. So if the standard deviation of EM endowment in period 
2 is small, EM is effectively insured against low consumption in the bad state. 
Therefore, no additional saving is required. 
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Figure 4a. Unchanged equilibrium when the loss aversion constraint fails to bind  
 
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 4a, where point E represents optimal 
consumption allocation with loss aversion. The loss aversion constraint is 
represented the L-shaped lined emanating from the point * *1 1Y C= , and all EM 
consumption allocations to the north-east of this point satisfy the constraint. As point 
E lies on the contract curve north-east of point * *1 1Y C= , the loss aversion constraint 
is not binding; and equilibrium in Figure 4a is identical to that in Figure 3. When risk 
increases, however, equilibrium can change as indicated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. For the endowment structure given in Table 2, if 2gσ > , then 
(1) )1()1( qq LA >  and )2()2( qq LA > ; 
(2) )1(/)2()1(/)2( qqqq LALA > ; 
(3) rr LA < ; 
(4) *1
*
1 )( CLAC ≤ . 
(5) * * * *2 2 2 2(2, ) / (1, ) (2) / (1)C LA C LA C C>  
 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
Results in Proposition 2 are quite intuitive. If the standard deviation of period 2 EM 
endowment is large, simple risk sharing is not sufficient to ensure that the 
consumption in the bad state remains above the reference level for the EM country. 
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So loss aversion increases EM’s demand for insurance in period 2. As this raises the 
relative price )1(/)2( LALA qq , EM also increases savings as a substitute for high cost 
insurance. (Note that period 1 savings for EM not only act as a substitute for 
insurance but also reduce the reference consumption in period 2, making the 
constraint less likely to bind.) Proposition 2(5) implies that consumption allocation in 
period 2 when loss aversion constraint is binding lies above the contract curve 
associated with no loss aversion. 
 
Suppose we allow EM to have a different parameters for time preference, 'β , and 
the subjective probability parameter, 'π , while keeping those of US as before, can 
we replicate the outcomes in Proposition 2 without evoking the assumption of loss 
aversion? The results for this “as if” exercise are given in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. For a set of parameters }',';,{ πβπβ  (and given restriction on 
endowments as in Proposition 2) to replicate the equilibrium results in Proposition 2, 
it is sufficient that 
(1) πβπβ
βππ <++
+=
)2()1(
))2(1(' LA
LA
q
q
 
(2) βπβ
βπββ >−+
++=
)1(1
)2()1('
LAq
 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 3 indicates that the effects of introducing loss aversion on the part of the 
EM will (when the constraint is binding) be to increase its perceived pessimism 
( ππ <' ) and to make it more forward-looking ( ββ >' ). 
 
How loss aversion can impact on global equilibrium is illustrated using Figure 4b, the 
Edgeworth box used earlier. As before, points A and E represent EM’s second period 
endowment and consumption allocation in the absence of loss aversion. With large 
enough σ , however, the loss aversion constraint becomes binding and EM will 
increase its first period savings (Proposition 2(4)), moving its second period effective 
endowment from A (along the 45 degree line) to B.  The binding of the loss aversion 
constraint will also change relative Arrow prices (Proposition 2(2)), making EM’s 
period 2 budget constraint flatter (see line BE’). The intersection of the budget line 
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BE’ with the loss aversion constraint 
* *
2 1( )C L C=  defines the new equilibrium E’ which 
lies above the contract curve due to Proposition 2(5). From A, a combination of 
savings and an asset swap of US bonds for FDI allows for consumption at point E’ 
satisfying the loss aversion constraint.  
 
 
Figure 4b: Savings and insurance with Loss Aversion; it’s ‘as if’ time preference has 
fallen and pessimism has increased in EM. 
 
As indicated in Proposition 3, this new equilibrium may also be replicated without loss 
aversion if EM has lower time preference (higher β ) and greater pessimism (lower 
π ). As can be seen in Figure 4b, the increase in pessimism in the EM, calibrated by 
a fall in ππ /'  , has two effects: first it makes the contract curve concave, and second 
it changes the relative Arrow prices which makes EM’s budget constraint flatter. The 
decrease in the time preference, calibrated by the increase in ββ /' , has the effect of 
increasing EM’s savings and so shifting its second period effective endowments from 
A to B. The intersection of the budget constraint BE’ with the modified contract curve 
defines the equilibrium. 
 
The quantitative significance of loss aversion on real interest rates and savings is 
indicated in lines 6 and 7 for the third case considered in Table 3. With the standard 
deviation of up to 6%, the constraint is not binding, so the real interest rates and 
savings are the same as in the benchmark case. But the effect of loss aversion 
becomes apparent when the standard deviation increases to 12%: this generates a 
H igh  EM 
US 
Old Contract 
Curve
A
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BE
E’
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BondsFDI
B’
σ C2*(L)=C1*
M
C1* 
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substantial increase in the EM savings and a marked fall in the global interest rates. 
As a consequence, the US deficit rises by 1% of GDP as a 0.7% fall of the real 
interest rates encourages US consumption.  
Table 4 indicates the parameter values necessary to replicate the equilibrium with 
loss aversion by changing time preferences and state probability assessment on the 
part of EM. When 12%σ = , for example, ' 1.03β β= and ' 0.98π π= will generate the 
same equilibrium allocation as under loss aversion. 
 
σ  Loss aversion 
constraint 
ββ /'  ππ /'  
3% Not binding 1 1 
6% Not binding 1 1 
12% Binding 1.03 0.98 
18% Binding 1.07 0.97 
Table 4. Loss aversion, less time preferences and more pessimism. 
 
 
4.2 Loss aversion with incomplete markets 
 
Results in the section above show how loss aversion can significantly increase 
savings and reduce the world interest rate, even though both countries share risk in 
the second period. But global financial markets are notoriously incomplete, as 
emphasised by Wolf (2005) and Griffith-Jones and Shiller (2006). What happens if 
we assume that EMs can not swap their risky debt for US bonds but can accumulate 
the latter through current account surpluses? Results for this bond-only case is 
summarised in the propositions below, and the quantitative significance indicated by 
numerical examples. 
 
Proposition 4. For gσ ≤ , the equilibrium real interest rates and consumption 
allocations are the same for bonds only without loss aversion (see Section 3.2.)  
But for gσ > , the constraint * *2 1(2)C C≥  binds, and the equilibrium real interest rate is 
2 2
1 2
1
4 /(1 )
1
2 /(1 )
YY
r
Y
ψ ψ β β
β β
− + + ++ = +       (14) 
where *1 1 2 2/(1 ) (2) /(1 )Y Y Y Yψ β β β= + + − − + .  
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The consumption allocation for EM is given by 
* * *
2 2 1 2(1) (1) (1 )( (2)) /(2 )C Y r Y Y r= + + − +     (15) 
* * *
2 1 1 2(2) [(1 ) (2)] /(2 )C C r Y Y r= = + + +     (16) 
and the consumption allocation for US can be obtained simply by using the market 
clearing conditions. 
 
Proof: For gσ ≤ , one can show that * *2 1(2)C C≥ , so real interest rates and 
consumption allocation in Section 3.2 still constitute the equilibrium solution. 
For gσ > , however, solutions in Section 3.2 violate the constraint * *2 1(2)C C≥ . 
Imposing binding constraint yields the optimal consumption for EM as in (15) and 
(16). The optimal consumption for US, derived in the same way as in Section 3.2, 
gives 
2
1 1
1
1 1 1
Y WC Y
rβ β
⎛ ⎞= + ≡⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠       (17) 
2 2
(1 )(1) (2)
1
r WC C β β
+= = +       (18) 
Using market clearing condition 1
*
11 2YCC =+  one arrives at the equilibrium real 
interest rates represented by (14). Using (14), one can back out the equilibrium 
consumption for both US and EM. 
 
Two implications of the above proposition are worth noting. First that, with bonds 
only, the loss aversion constraint * *2 1(2)C C=  binds for a smaller σ  than is the case 
when Arrow securities can be traded. This is because the removal of state-contingent 
securities means that risk can not be shared at a global level, so EM has to self-
insure by increasing savings even for a moderateσ . Second that, when the loss 
aversion constraint is binding, the global real interest rate is determined 
independently of state probabilities.  
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Figure 5. Loss Aversion and Precautionary Saving 
 
In state space form, equilibrium with fear and market failure is shown in Figure 5. 
Note that due to incomplete markets, there is no asset swap of GDP-bonds: instead, 
to acquire US bonds, EM is forced to self-insure by saving in period 1. The effective 
endowment position in period 2 shifts from A to B where the vector AB includes the 
interest rate on savings. How this interest rate is determined can be seen in the 
following Fisher diagram. 
 
As before, the horizontal axis measures endowments and consumption in period 1, 
and the vertical outcomes in period 2. Point A describes the income in both periods 
for US and the hyperbola AF represents US offer curve15. (Point A also indicates first 
period income and average second period endowments for EM.) For any given 
interest rate, the intersection of the appropriate US budget constraint AA’ and the 
offer curve AF determines the optimal inter-temporal consumption allocation of the 
US (at point A’) and the US current account deficit. 
 
                                                 
15 The parametric representations of the US offer curve is given by the US inter-temporal budget 
constraint and the proportionality condition, 2 1/ (1 )C C r β= + , implied by its first order conditions. 
Replacing the real interest rates in one of the equations using the other gives the US offer curve. 
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Figure 6: Global Equilibrium: Precautionary Saving and “the consumer of last resort” 
 
Turning to the EM, when the constraint is binding its inter-temporal budget constraint, 
* * *
1 2 1 2( ) /(1 ) ( ) /(1 )C C L r Y Y L r+ + = + + , is represented by the downward sloping line 
passing through low state endowment L. To satisfy the constraint, consumption in the 
first period and in the low state in the second period must lie on the 45-degree line 
OC. The intersection of the budget line LL’ and this 45-degree line determines the 
EM precautionary savings, indicated by the horizontal distance *1 1C Y . As σ  increases, 
and point L moves downwards, precautionary savings will go up. 
 
How is the world interest rate to be determined? For markets to clear in period 1, the 
real interest rate has to fall sufficiently so that extra consumption by the US balances 
precautionary savings by the emerging markets. In Martin Wolf’s words, the US has 
to act as the global ‘consumer of last resort’ (Wolf, 2006). Diagrammatically, the real 
interest rate must be chosen such that vector of excess consumption AA’ is equal 
and opposite to the precautionary savings vector LL’, as in Figure 6.  It is clear from 
the figure that an increase in σ  would result in an increase in the EM’s savings. To 
ensure that this is matched by the US deficit, the budget line AA’ has to rotate anti-
clock-wise, reducing real interest rates.  
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Three observations are clear from the Figure. First, that as L’ is on a budget line 
which lies below the usual Fisherian inter-temporal budget constraint, loss aversion 
can apparently generate outcomes observationally equivalent to the lack of 
capitalisation postulated by Caballero et al  (2006) and the contrarian view of Cooper 
(2005). 
 
The second that the predictions for savings and global interest rates in period 1 do 
not depend on the state probabilities. Figure 6 illustrates the global equilibrium for the 
case where high and low states are equi-probable: so the US trading vector AA’ is 
balanced by the equally weighted EM’s trading vectors LL’ and HH’. Consequently, 
when high state is realised in period 2, this model predicts a massive increase in the 
EM’s state consumption (given by point H’). But this unrealistic prediction can easily 
be modified without changing savings behaviour. Consider for example, the case of 
asymmetric shocks where there is low probability of a large negative shock and a 
high probability of a small positive shock, see Jeanne and Ranciere (2006). 
 
To keep the mean-preserving feature of the EM’s second period state endowments, 
requires 2 2 2( ) (1 )( )H LY Y Yπ σ π σ+ + − − =  or 1H Lπσ σπ
−= , where Hσ  is the shock 
in the high state and Lσ  that in the low state. By fixing Lσ  at the same level as that 
in Figure 6, one can choose π  close to 1 to make Hσ  arbitrarily small. This would 
yield the same equilibrium savings as drawn in Figure 6, but reduce EM’s high state 
consumption substantially. This is because savings and the interest rate do not 
depend on how likely the low state is but on how bad it is. 
 
 
The third observation is that, given expectations of a large negative shock, 
equilibrium real interest rates can be negative. In terms of the figure, this will occur 
when the point A’ on the US offer curve required to match these savings is 
sufficiently far to the right that the budget line has an absolute slope less than unity. 
 
 The algebraic condition for negative real rates is as follows: 
 
Proposition 5. Given the endowment structure specified in Table 2, the real interest 
rate 0r ≤  for (2 2 ) /(1 ) [2 /(1 ) 1]gσ β β β≥ − + + + + . 
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Proof: From (14), imposing the condition 0r ≤ , one obtains the parameter restriction 
given in the above proposition. 
 
This is illustrated numerically in the last two lines of Table 3, where for σ=12% 
savings reaches 4.6% and the equilibrium real interest rate fall to -4.3%16.  
 
The relationship between real interest rates and risk for parameters of our 
benchmark model is illustrated in more detail in Figure 7 where the horizontal axis 
measures the negative shock to EM’s period 2 endowment and the equilibrium real 
interest rates is plotted on the vertical axis. When the loss aversion constraint is not 
binding real interest rates decrease very slowly with increasing σ; but when the loss 
aversion constraint is binding the real interest rates fall sharply as risk increases. 
From Proposition 5, the critical level of σ beyond which the real interest turns 
negative turns out to be about 7.5% for the parameters used here. 
 
2 4 6 8 10 12 Sigma
-4
-2
2
4
Interest Rate
 
Figure 7.  Real interest rates and risk: numerical results. 
 
Possible ramifications of negative real interest rates are discussed below. Here we 
summarise the results of the earlier calibrations in a new table, where the effect of 
fear is captured by moving from orthodox preferences to loss aversion and that of 
market failure by restricting the set of Arrow securities. As can be seen from Column 
1, fear does cause some increase in global imbalances but not a great deal; similarly 
from row 1 we see that market failure also increases global imbalances, but only 
                                                 
16 Note that in their paper on the optimal level of international reserves for emerging market countries, 
Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) assume a crisis output cost of 10% in their benchmark calibration.  
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marginally. It is when fear and market failure combine that global imbalances become 
significant and real interest rates can turn negative.  
 
               
Arrow-Debreu Incomplete Markets 
Orthodox 
preferences 
 Δ deficit/GDP  
 Δ interest rate  
 +0.2 
          -0.3 
 +0.3 
          -0.6 
Loss Aversion in 
EM 
 Δ deficit/GDP  
 Δ interest rate  
 +1.2 
          -1.4 
 +4.6 
           -8.8 
Table 4.  The effect of increasing risk (from benchmark of σ = 3 to σ=12) 
 
Note: For Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) σ of 10% might lead to imbalances of about 
5%. 
 
 
5. Strategic considerations 
 
All the calculations reported above assume competitive equilibrium even when the 
set of assets is incomplete. But, as Dooley and Garber (2005) point out, the big 
players in asset markets are governments who can manipulate supply. Furthermore, 
Meissner and Taylor have shown how Britain in the years 1870–1913 and US in 
years 1981 – 2003 have been able to enjoy a “privilege” in the form of higher yields 
earned on external assets than paid on external liabilities – worth about 0.5% of GDP 
per annum in both cases. Could this, in the terminology of Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger (2005), be the “dark matter” which allows the US to sustain substantial 
portfolio imbalance? Maybe so, but Meissner and Taylor warn that such monopoly 
power is a fading asset: the privilege is much higher in earlier years than later.17 
 
Could one modify the competitive equilibrium by allowing for monopoly power on the 
part of the US? Instead of supplying safe asset on a competitive basis, US could, for 
example, select the utility maximising point on the demand for safe asset from the 
EM: or could it act as a dynamic monopolist?18 As indicated by Table below this 
                                                 
17The gradual disappearance of the privilege is examined in Thamotheram, 2006. 
18 Supplying dollars at high prices as the RoW accumulates reserves, with a dollar devaluation when 
reserve stock reaches equilibrium, see Section 7.2 below. 
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might generate outcomes between limit cases (of complete markets and no 
insurance) reported in the paper. 
 
 Arrow-Debreu Market power Self-insurance 
Standard 
preferences 
Low savings  
Fair Insurance  
More saving 
Overpriced insurance 
High Precautionary Savings 
No insurance 
Loss aversion Same as 
above, unless 
binding 
High Precautionary 
Savings 
Overpriced insurance 
High Precautionary Savings  
No insurance 
 
Table 7. General Equilibrium solutions:  Is there a place for strategic analysis? 
 
6. Sustainability: a comparison  
 
It may be interesting to compare what we get from a general equilibrium approach 
with results reported in a recent IMF study of the optimal reserves by Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2005). For an emerging market economy facing a low spread in capital 
markets, the risk of a 10% fall in output should lead to reserve holdings of 9.37% of 
GDP, see discussion of Table 3 in their paper. Note that, as all these reserves will be 
used to maintain consumption when there is a shock and they are all reconstituted 
one period later, it is as if such a shock is associated with a corresponding savings 
rate of nine and a half percent of GDP over the post crisis period of reserve build up. 
As there is no insurance in their model, this is to be compared with our bonds-only 
case, where the build-up of reserve assets precedes the crisis. For a shock with a 
downside of 12% our figure for savings is about four and a half percent. While this is 
only about half as much as for Jeanne and Ranciere (2006), this may be because we 
allow for consumption smoothing across the two periods while their static 
simplification rules this out.19 
 
Two observations may be made – over the period of time that reserves are built up, 
and over the implications for sustainability. As a preliminary, note that the actual 
reserve holdings by China greatly exceed the savings figures just discussed: from 
around 16% of GDP in 2000 they almost doubled to reach 29% in 2003, Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2006, Table 1). This suggests that treating the issue in a two period 
                                                 
19 For countries facing high interest rates, however, the optimal reserve holding is calculated to be only 
about 1½% of GDP – with a correspondingly lower saving rate, Jeanne and Ranciere (2006, Table 3). 
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context (as the IMF study and we do) is too restrictive. The level of reserves may be 
built up over a period of two or three years – and it can be expanded by assets 
swaps as well as external surpluses, as the case with insurance has shown. 
 
The second observation is that the reserve build-up is essentially a transitional 
phenomenon: once reserves have reached their desired level, there is no need for 
high precautionary savings 20 . This has profound implications: high savings, low 
interest rate outcomes we have studied are not to be thought of as steady-state 
equilibria, but as temporary phenomena. Putting it more bluntly, the precautionary 
approach implies that the current pattern of imbalances is not sustainable. What this 
might mean for global equilibrium is considered in Section 7.2. 
 
7. The possibility of Keynesian equilibria  
 
7.1 The Liquidity Trap 
 
No matter that EM saving rises sharply as perceived risk increases, markets will clear 
so long as the real interest rate is free to adjust. That is the message of the 
calculations at the end of Section 4: and it seems to suggest that the model we 
propose, like that of Caballero et al., is one of full employment equilibrium, loss 
aversion or no. 
 
It was found, however, that market-clearing interest rates have to be negative for 
substantial risk (σ > 7.5%). What if there is a zero lower bound on the real interest 
rate? This will imply that the US deficit is less than high savings in the EM in these 
circumstances: in other words, global demand will fall short of global supply at full 
employment levels of income. 
 
When might such a bound be relevant? Consider a world with fixed nominal prices 
and a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate: in such a world, real rates can 
be lowered by cutting nominal rates, but they cannot go below zero. (Nor would 
adding price flexibility help, unless prices are expected to rise.) The case of Japan, 
where the collapse of the Nikkei in the early 1990s was followed by a decade or more 
                                                 
20 We can show this in the GE context by changing the initial holding of bonds by the RoW, which play 
the same role as reserves as in the analysis of Jeanne and Ranciere (2006). 
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of inadequate demand with sticky prices and near zero nominal rates, may serve to 
illustrate.  
 
If one was to impose an exogenous zero bound on the real rates, how is the model to 
be solved? One will have to make assumptions of what happens when markets do 
not clear: that supply contracts until global demand and supply balance, for example. 
Assuming that EM savings were proportional to its first period income, then a 
contraction of EM income is sufficient to cut EM savings to match the US full 
employment deficit would equate demand and supply. This is, in fact, something like 
what happened after the East Asian crisis when countries in the region went into 
sharp recession and the US acted as the ‘consumer of last resort’. But if income in 
both countries can be treated as endogenous, there will be many other equilibria, as 
there are two variables and only one constraint21.  
 
Rather than pursuing this thought experiment much further, it is better to 
acknowledge that one is re-examining issues at the heart of the debate between 
Keynes and the Classics. Faced with a rise of savings, Classical economists argued 
that interest rates would fall as needed to equate savings and investment (and 
preserve full employment). Keynes objected that interest rates would be subject to a 
lower bound (set by the Liquidity Trap) and, for this reason, income would become 
endogenous, falling until savings matched investment. The Japanese experience has 
led to a resurgence of interest in Keynesian equilibria, most notably in the 1998 
Brookings Paper by Paul Krugman subtitled “Japan’s Slump and the Return of the 
Liquidity Trap”. 
 
7.2  A ‘Sudden Stop’? 
 
Given robust expectations of growth, current real interest rates are surprisingly low; 
but the world is not in a liquidity trap. Nevertheless, the pattern of global imbalances 
has given economists cause for concern. Does the global model sustain such 
concern or not? First, we conclude that a pattern of global imbalances where high 
savings in the EM is matched by corresponding US deficits is essentially a 
transitional phenomenon. So some adjustment will have to come. 
 
                                                 
21 It may be tempting, for this reason to aggregate across the two regions and treat the world as a closed 
economy. 
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When reserve positions are adequate, there will be no need for additional 
precautionary saving, and EM should consume more and the US less. In addition, 
however, relative prices may need to adjust. This is spelled out in detail in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2005), for example, who argue that the price of US non-traded goods will 
have to fall sharply relative to EM non-traded goods, and the relative price of US 
traded goods will also have to fall. Given the objective of keeping the aggregate price 
indices constant in each block, they calculate that this translates into a decline of 
about 30% in the dollar. In their view, moreover, the perception that the situation is 
not sustainable and that adjustment requires a fall in the dollar leaves the US 
vulnerable to a Sudden Stop in capital flows.  
 
No adjustment of relative prices is necessary in our one good model: but what if, 
nonetheless, there a Sudden Stop were to occur constraining the US to balance its 
current account? This would of course prevent the US from acting as ‘consumer of 
last resort’, and require the EM to achieve balance on its own. If there is a 
precautionary demand for savings outside the US – and particularly if there is limited 
access to insurance markets – an excess supply of global savings will emerge. But, 
in a world of low inflation and low nominal rates, the Classical argument that the 
implied shortage of global demand can be remedied by an appropriate lowering of 
interest rates lacks conviction. We have seen that a Liquidity Trap could, in principle, 
prevent this adjustment even where the US is free to act as ‘consumer of last resort’: 
how can it be relied to work in circumstances when the US consumption is checked 
by financial panic? 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
A model of global equilibrium where countries outside the US face higher risk than 
the US itself can lead to current account surpluses in the EM. If it is driven by Loss 
Aversion, such precautionary savings can cause substantial ‘global imbalances’, 
particularly if there is an inefficient supply of global insurance. In principle, this simply 
requires lower real interest rates to ensure that aggregate demand equals supply at 
the global level (though the required real interest may turn out to be negative). A 
situation with low interest rates and high savings outside the US thus appears to be 
an efficient global equilibrium: but is it sustainable? 
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A precautionary savings glut appears to us to be a temporary phenomenon, destined 
for correction as and when adequate reserve levels are achieved. In a realistic 
setting with differentiated traded and non-traded goods, this correction will also 
require a substantial change in relative prices. So expectations of adjustment may 
lead to a pre-emptive Sudden Stop in capital flows to the US, as Obstfeld and Rogoff 
have suggested. 
 
If the process of correction is triggered by panic, could it not lead to the inefficient 
outcomes that concern macroeconomists such as Eichengreen and Park, Roubini 
and Setser, and Martin Wolf? The unprecedented savings levels recorded in East 
Asia since 1997/8 financial crises and the prolonged failure of Japan to escape from 
a Liquidity Trap would then appear as early warning signals: and the failure to effect 
a smooth transfer after the first World War, leading as it did to a Liquidity Trap and 
the emergence of Keynesian under-employment economics, as a precedent that 
should not be ignored. Blithe trust in market forces may be misplaced. When 
precautionary savings is combined with financial panic, history offers no guarantee of 
full employment. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Note that the modification of Foreign preferences only affects the partial equilibrium 
allocation for the Foreign country. To solve for the optimal consumptions for the 
Foreign country, we first replace *1C  in (13) and (12) using budget constraint (14) to 
form the following Lagrangean: 
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(A3) and (A4) are complementary slackness conditions. 
 
Given )2()1( *2
*
2 YY > , there are only three possible cases: (i) 021 == λλ , (ii) 01 =λ  
and 02 >λ , and (iii) 01 >λ  and 02 >λ . 
 
For 021 == λλ , (A1), (A2) and budget constraint (14) imply 
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The equilibrium conditions ensure that )1()1( qq LA =  and )2()2( qq LA =  (where )1(q  
and )2(q  are given by (6) and (7)). 
Using constraints *1
*
2 )1( CC ≥  and *1*2 )2( CC ≥ , one arrives at WW YY 12 )1( ≥  and 
WW YY 12 )1( ≥ , or 02 ≥−σg  for endowments given in Table 1. As )1()1( qq LA =  and 
)2()2( qq LA = , the general equilibrium allocation will be the same as in Section 2.1. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Consider the second case outlined above, namely, 01 =λ  and 02 >λ . The first 
order conditions become 
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To ensure (B5) – (B7) constitute optimal solutions for the Foreign country, we need to 
impose the restrictions on the Lagrange multipliers as those given at the beginning. 
Condition 01 =λ  implies *1*2 )1( CC ≥ . From (B5) and (B6), this requires 
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From (B7), condition 02 >λ  requires 
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To solve for the equilibrium prices, we impose the following market clearing 
conditions: 
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This Arrow price relationship is exactly the same as the one in complete markets 
without loss aversion. 
 
Replacing )1(LAq  in the state price relationship implied by (B11) yields the following 
quadratic equation for )2(LAq  
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With (B15) and assumptions made in Table 1 ( WW YY 12 )1( > ), (B8) is satisfied. So 
(B15) is the parameter restriction used in Proposition 2. 
 
Rearranging (B13), one can show 
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The effect of loss aversion on the equilibrium real interest rates is straightforward to 
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To show (5) in Proposition 2, note that from (B5), (B6), (4)—(7), one has 
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hand side of the above equation is strictly greater than 1. 
 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
With parameters }','{ πβ  for the Foreign country, the optimal consumption without 
loss aversion gives arise the following set of first order conditions: 
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